We examine the transmission mechanism of banking sector shocks in a twocountry DSGE model. Assuming that the home country is small relative to the rest of world, we find that spillovers from foreign banking sector shocks are modest unless banks in the small country hold foreign banking assets. The correlation between home and foreign GDP rises with the exposure of the domestic banking sector to foreign bank assets.
Introduction
The 2007 financial crisis originated in the United States and was the longest contraction (measured in months from peak to trough) since the great depression. A feature that differentiates the 2007 recession from previous post-war US recessions is the degree to which it was accompanied by simultaneous downturns in many other other developed economies. This feature suggests a strong international transmission mechanism of shocks originating in the banking sector. sample, with the exception of Australia, the magnitude of the contraction differs across the three groups of countries.
In countries with relatively small and domestically focussed banking sectors, as measured by McGuire and von Peter (2009) , such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway, the post-2007 downturns tended to be less severe than in the US. In contrast, countries with large banking sectors and high exposure to foreign assets, such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland, and the Netherlands, the spillovers from the US tended to be more pronounced and often more severe than in the US itself. Figure 1 suggests a degree of heterogeneity in the international transmission mechanism across countries. Figure 2 is the implied fitted line of the scatter plot and the dashed line is the the one that emerges if we leave out Ireland from the sample. 1 The negative 1 Kelly (2010) and Lane (2011) argue strongly that the Irish financial crisis should be seen as largely correlation suggests that countries with banks that hold large foreign currency asset positions, are associated with larger output losses during the financial crisis. This paper analyses the international transmission mechanism of banking sector
shocks for small open economies with relatively large banks. Our model shows that spillovers from banking sector shocks are small if home and foreign banks are largely independent and large if banks in the small country banks intermediate both domestic as well as a small fraction of foreign country loans.
Modeling financial intermediation in closed economy DSGE models goes back at least to the financial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999) and more recently to Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) , Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) , Meh and Moran (2010) , Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) , Benk et al. (2010) and Gerali et al. (2010) Olivero (2010) and Kollmann et al. (2011) .
Our analysis is related to Kollmann et al. (2011) who show that with a fully globalized banking sector, large spillovers are possible from country-specific banking sector shocks. Our approach differs from theirs in a number of dimensions. First, we focus not on the spillovers arising from two equally sized economies, but focus instead on the interactions between a large economy, say the US, on the one hand and a small open economy, on the other. Second, instead of assuming a fully globalized banking sector, our focus is on banking sectors that are largely independent. To capture the effects of large banks in small countries, we allow banks resident in the small country to have small, but relative to the size of their economy large, exposure to foreign bank assets.
Third, we consider a richer open economy framework, that allows us the analyze both terms of trade or real exchange rate as well as current account dynamics in response to banking sector shocks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out a twocountry business cycle model with financial intermediation. Section 3 describes the model's deep parameters and our estimated driving processes. Section 4 analyses the model using impulse response analysis as well as second moments generated by the independent of the US financial crisis and was not triggered by bank losses arising from holdings of US sub-prime debt, but rather by domestic loan losses. model economies. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The model
At its core, the model is a two-country international business cycle model with flexible prices and wages. Departing from the standard international real business cycle (IRBC) model, a competitive banking sector that stands in between households and entrepreneurs is introduced. Households are assumed to be more patient than entrepreneurs, ensuring that in steady state, there is demand for both deposits and loans. In both countries, patient households hold deposits in a global bank that issues loans to home and foreign banks. Each representative bank combines bank liabilities with bank capital to make loans to impatient entrepreneurs.
The model is applied to a setting where one country is small, relative to the other.
A defining feature of the small economy is that its banking sector is relatively large, given the relative size of the economy. Banks owned by small-country households make loans to both domestic and foreign-country entrepreneurs.
The dynamics of the model are driven by country specific shocks to total factor productivity in the goods producing sector and shocks that redistribute income between entrepreneurs and banks.
Households
We propose a two-country model with infinitely lived consumers. The world economy is populated by a continuum of agents on the interval [0, 1] . The population on the segment [0, n) belongs to the home country, while the segment [n, 1] belongs to foreign country. The representative agent in both countries smooths consumption over time by purchasing deposits issued in units of foreign currency with a one period return of r * d t . The representative household receives wage income, w t l t , as well as dividends, T t , from owning domestic final goods producers as well as the domestic banking sector.
Equation (1) shows the budget constraint for the representative household in the home country.
P t denotes the price of the domestic consumption good. The final consumption good, c t , is a CES aggregate of home and foreign-produced final goods. S t denotes the nominal exchange rate, defined as the home-currency price of unit of foreign currency.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the agent's decision on how much to save or dis-save in period t depends on the interest rate available in the spot market on savings (deposits) in period t.
(1 + r t ) is the total nominal return to one unit of savings held in the form of deposits between periods t and t + 1.
The standard first-order conditions arising from maximizing expected intertemporal welfare, defined over consumption and labour are:
An analogous constraint and set of optimality conditions characterize the foreigncountry household's decision problem.
International Risk-sharing
The consumption-based real exchange rate deviates from purchasing power parity because of home bias in consumption. Movements in the real exchange rate, defined as
Pt are related to movements in the relative marginal utilities of consumption via the the standard international risk sharing condition under incomplete markets:
Final goods producers
Final goods, y, are produced using capital, rented from the entrepreneur, and labour.
Final goods are used for both consumption and investment in both the home and the foreign economy. P H is the price of the home-produced traded good. Profits of the goods producing firm are defined as follows:
and are maximized subject to the production function:
As the goods producer is owned by the household, future profits are discounted by the representative household's stochastic discount factor. The maximisation problem yields the following optimality conditions for labour and capital inputs:
The foreign-country final goods producer faces an analogous optimization problem.
Banks
Apart from the goods producer, the representative agent also owns the banking system.
Home and foreign banks both raise deposits from the global bank. The foreign bank, resident in the large economy, only advances loans to foreign-country entrepreneurs.
Home-country banks, on the other hand, make loans to entrepreneurs in both countries.
Our model of financial intermediation follows the wholesale banks set up in Gerali et al. (2010) . The profit function of the home bank, denominated in units of domestic currency per capita, is characterized as follows:
Each period, the bank makes loans to home entrepreneurs, q t . Home-country banks also intermediate a fraction, ξ of the foreign country's total loans. We are at this stage abstracting from the reasons why the home banking sector is active in the foreign market, and assume simply that home country banks intermediate a fraction ξ of foreign loans. As π B t are bank profits per capita, and q * are foreign per capita loans, we adjust lending to foreign firms by the relative size of the foreign country in term of the home country. As the home country is assumed to be small relative to the foreign country, home banks take the interest rate on loans prevailing in the foreign country as given, such that r * q t is the interest on loans faced by foreign entrepreneurs. Following Kollmann et al. (2011) , we assume that each period only a fraction t of one-period loans advanced in the previous period is repaid with interest. Bank profits are adversely affected if the realized repayment rate falls below that expected at the time the loan was made. As the home-country bank makes loans at home as well as abroad, shocks to the foreign repayment rate have a direct affect on bank profits.
Banks are funded via liabilities obtained from the 'global' bank. Bank liabilities, D t are denominated in foreign currency. The interest rate payable on liabilities is the interest rate on deposits available to the representative consumer Banks face a balance sheet constraint that requires total lending to be backed by borrowed liabilities as well as banks' own capital stock:
where total lending is denoted: Q t = q t +ξS t q * t . Banks accumulate capital via retained earnings.
Each period, the financial intermediary distributes a constant fraction (1 − ω) of profits (π B t ) to shareholders while using the remainder to augment the bank's own capital stock. δ B captures the costs to the bank of managing the bank's capital stock.
Deviations from a prescribed bank capital-to-loans ratio, z, are costly. One can rationalize such a cost by assuming that adjusting the bank's capital position is costly. Kollmann et al. (2011) motivate a similar cost by the need for "creative accounting"
should the bank capital-to-loans ratio fall below the prescribed level.
The optimization problem of the banking sector, using the owner's stochastic discount factor, yields the following optimality condition for the evolution of the interest rate spread:
The discounted real interest rate spread between bank loans and liabilities is driven by the evolution of the bank capital-to-loans ratio. A ratio above z reduces the spread, whereas a ratio below z raises the spread. 2 In setting the interest rate on loans, the bank takes into account the expected re-payment rate (implicitly the default rate)
in the period when the loan is due to be repaid. Because the bank makes loans to entrepreneurs in both countries, unanticipated shocks to the repayment rates in both countries ( and * ) affect the interest rate spread faced by domestic entrepreneurs.
An unanticipated decline in t raises (1+r q t ) directly. By leading to a loss for the bank, equation (10), a decline in t reduces the bank's capital stock. For a given level of total bank lending, the intermediation margin will have to rise to generate bank profits with which to rebuild the bank's capital stock. When there is a negative repayment shock on lending to foreign entrepreneurs, the domestic spread rises due to resulting reduction in bank profits.
Impatient entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs produce capital goods that are rented out to final goods producers.
Entrepreneurs differ from households with respect to their subjective rate of time preference, they are assumed to be less patient than households. The relative impatience of entrepreneurs ensures that in the steady state, we have both borrowing and lending. 3
Entrepreneurs maximize expected utility
defined only over consumption, subject to the following budget, capital accumulation and borrowing constraints:
The corresponding bank lending spread for the foreign economy is:
3 An alternative to this assumption would be to create a demand for deposits and thus loans by introducing deposit holdings into the household's utility function.
(1 + r q t )E t t+1
Where ρ is the rental rate of capital paid by the good producer, q t are new loans from the banking sector, (1+r q t−1 ) t is the fraction of the interest rate payable plus the principle of last period's loans that are repaid. As in Kollmann et al. (2011) , the repayment shock represents a transfer between entrepreneurs and banks. In order to rule out that entrepreneurs benefit directly from a negative shock to , we introduce a transfer, t E , from the entrepreneur to the owners of the bank that prevents entrepreneurial consumption from rising when declines. This shock only affects the real economy via its effects on the bank's capital position. 4 s(.) captures investment adjustment costs as proposed by Christiano et al (2005), ϕ denotes the price of capital and χ the loan-to-valuation ratio constraining entrepreneurial borrowing. At time t, lending to entrepreneurs is constrained to a fraction, χ, of the discounted market price of next period's un-depreciated capital stock.
The entrepreneur's maximisation problem yields the following optimality conditions for entrepreneurial consumption, borrowing, investment as well as next period's desired capital stock:
∆ t is the Lagrange multiplier on the entrepreneur's borrowing constraint. If ∆ t = 0 and the constraint is non-binding, then the entrepreneur behaves in exactly the same manner as the household. 5
An analogous set of constraints and first-order conditions apply to the foreign economy's entrepreneurial sector.
Small open economy as a limiting case of a two country model
The relative size of the home economy, n, is small. Sutherland (2005) shows a simple way to nest a small open economy model as a special case of a two-country model. Total consumption in both countries is defined as the sum of household and entrepreneurial consumption:
Total consumption in the home country is defined as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of home and foreign produced goods:
where C H and C F are home and foreign produced consumption goods, respectively. θ is the elasticity of substitution between these two types of goods. Sutherland (2005) links the share of home-produced goods in home total consumption v to the relative size of the country and its openness to trade, γ:
The share of home-produced goods in foreign total consumption, v * becomes:
In the limit, when n approaches zero the share of home-produced goods in foreign consumption tends to zero, v * = 0, and the foreign economy behaves just like a closed economy. In the home economy, the share of home-produced goods in total consumption, v, becomes a function of the degree of openness of the home economy, v = 1 − γ. Pt . In linearized form, these two relative prices (from the home country's perspective) are related by the degree of openness to tradê
Consolidated budget constraint
The dynamics of the net foreign asset position of the domestic economy are derived by consolidating the household's and the entrepreneur's budget constraints. The patient household owns both the final goods producer and the bank and receives any residual profits from these two sectors. Adding the entrepreneur's constraint to the household's consolidated budget constraint yields:
where the net foreign asset position, B t = d t + 1−n n ξq t − D t is the difference between domestically held assets (agent's deposits with the global bank plus the value of overseas banking assets) and the home bank's borrowing from the global bank, determines the home country's net foreign asset position. 6 The management cost of bank capital, δ B K B t−1 is a net resource cost to the economy.
Closing the model
We have assumed that agents accumulate deposits denominated in units of foreigncountry currency. As a result, we have written down what is essentially a nominal model. It is straight forward to convert the model into a canonical international real business cycle model by assuming that the monetary authority follows a strict policy of setting producer price inflation to zero. As there are no nominal rigidities, this can be achieved at all times.
6 Implicitly, we treat adjustment cost faced by banks,
, as a tax on banks that gets rebated to the representative consumer and thus does not represent a resource cost to the economy.
Calibration
The two countries in our calibration exercise are the United Kingdom as the small home economy and the United States as the large foreign economy. The relative size of the home economy, n, is calibrated as the size of the United Kingdom economy relative to that of the rest of world. 7 Table 1 reports the initial calibrated parameters. Throughout, the unit of time is one quarter. The discount factor for patient households is set to 0.99, implying an annual interest rate on deposits held with the global bank of 4% in both countries.
Impatient entrepreneurs discount future income streams at an annualized rate of 6%.
We adopt the following functional form for the period utility function of the household:
and posit a log-utility function in consumption and labour by setting η = σ = 1. In the production function, the elasticity of output to capital is set to 0.25 while the depreciation rate is set to 0.025, its standard value in the literature. Initially for our analysis of impulse responses, the value of the investment adjustment cost parameter is set to zero. Below, we choose slightly different values of the parameter in order to match the observed relative volatility of investment in both the UK and the US. Impatient entrepreneur's borrowing is constrained by a loan-to-valuation ratio, χ of 0.70, a value suggested by Gerali et al. (2010) Calibrating the deep parameters of the financial intermediaries in our model, we use US data on total equity to total assets ratio of commercial banks to calibrate the steady state bank capital-to-loan ratio. Accordingly, the parameter z is set to 10%, 7 An alternative would have been to set the relative size of the small country as the UK's GDP relative to the US. This would, however, overstate the relative importance of UK shocks on the rest of the world. 1988 period. Following Gerali et al. (2010 , we set κ to 10 in our baseline calibration, and check the sensitivity our results to various values of this parameter. Finally we assume that 50% of bank profits are reinvested in bank capital and set ω to 0.5. The value of δ b is derived from the steady state relationships and equals 0.005 implying that the bank capital depreciates in an annual rate of roughly 2%.
The dynamics of the model are driven by country specific exogenous shocks to total factor productivity (TFP) and the repayment rate on bank loans. These exogenous variables are all assumed to follow AR(1) processes. Table 1 reports the AR(1) coefficients, the standard errors of the innovations as well as the correlation coefficients between domestic repayment and TFP shocks. The data appendix describes the data used to create these shock processes.
The main motivation of the paper is to investigate the role of financial intermediation on the international transmission of shocks. Therefore we abstract from the cross-country correlation of the shock processes and focus on the endogenous propagation mechanisms originating from the presence of the financial intermediation.
International transmission mechanism
This section addresses three issues. First, how does the addition of a banking sector into a canonical international business cycle model affect the transmission of productivity shocks? Second, how do repayment, or default, shocks transmit between open economies? Finally, how is this transmission mechanism altered if the small country has relatively large banks?
To address these issues, we initially consider impulse responses to real and financial shocks originating in the large economy and discuss how macroeconomic variables respond to these shocks. We then analyze the statistical properties of the model in order to assess its ability to match a selection of second moments of US and UK data.
Impulse response analysis
The solid lines in Figures 3 -9 show the response of home-country (the small open economy) variables and the dashed lines show those of the foreign economy. Figure   3 shows the response of selected variables to a negative unit TFP shock located in the foreign economy. This analysis helps to illustrate the role of banks in our model economy. As output and investment demand falls in foreign economy, so does the demand for bank loans. For a given stock of bank capital, the decline in bank lending also lowers the bank spread, i.e. the difference between the interest rate on bank loans, r * q versus bank liabilities, r * d . Foreign shocks are transmitted to the home economy via changes in the terms of trade, which via equation (24) is a linear function of the real exchange rate. In Figure 3 , the home country real exchange rate depreciates and acts to share consumption risk between the home and foreign country. As a result there is a modest decline in the components of domestic GDP. shocks is modest and the bank spread is pro-cyclical following a supply shock. This suggests that in order to generate a data congruent counter-cyclical spread, the model needs to be augmented by shocks originating in the financial sector. Figure 5 shows impulse responses to an unexpected, one-off reduction of * , the foreign loan repayment rate, for the special case in which home-country banks do not advance loans to foreign firms (ξ = 0). A negative shock to the loan repayment rate in our model, is a transfer from the banking sector to entrepreneurs. To avoid entrepreneurial consumption rising in response to such a shock, entrepreneurs are and bank lending in the foreign economy is due only to that part of the increase in the spread caused by the decline in bank capital. 9 The components of foreign GDP do not, however, all move in the same direction. There is a notable decline in investment as well as a rise in consumption. A similar counter-cyclical response of consumption is also found in response to investment specific technology shocks (Basu and Thoenissen (2011), Justiniano et al. (2011) ) and in response to entrepreneurial net worth shocks in financial accelerator models (Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) and Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) ).
9 If deviations in bank capital have no effect on the spread, i.e. if κ = 0, a "default" shock would only effect (1 + r * q t ) in a way that leaves (1 + r * q t )Et * t+1 unchanged. There would therefore be no effect on the real economy.
The international spillovers of repayment, or default shocks to our small economy are modest. Figure 5 suggests a very small initial decline in home GDP associated with a persistently worsening net foreign asset position. The initial response of the homecountry's real exchange rate (terms of trade) is to appreciate followed by a protracted depreciation. Just as with TFP shocks, the movements in the real exchange rate largely insulate the home economy against the effects of a foreign banking sector shock.
Interestingly, home-country banking variables such as the spread, bank lending or the bank capital stock are also virtually unaffected by a foreign default shock.
The role of the real exchange rate movements in insulating the home economy from foreign banking shocks is highlighted in Figure 6 where the small economy is assumed
to be completely open to trade, i.e. γ = 1 such that purchasing power parity holds at all time. In this case, the risk sharing condition, equation (5) Under this calibration, we get a significant decline in home-country output following a default shock by foreign entrepreneurs. Home output declines by about half as much as foreign output. A default by foreign entrepreneurs adversely affects home-country bank profits, reducing bank capital and therefore raising the intermediation margin faced by Figures 8 and 9 explore the transmission of foreign default shock when allowing for further heterogeneity between the home and foreign banking sectors. In Figure 8 , the banks in the home country maintain a higher bank capital-to-loans ratio, z, than do foreign banks. Paradoxically, maintaining a higher bank capital stock implies a larger increase in the home-country spread and subsequent larger decline in home-country investment and GDP.
In Figure 9 , banks in the home country face a higher cost of deviating from the target bank capital-to-loan ratio, κ than do foreign banks. A higher κ is associated with a more volatile interest rate spread, which increases the degree to which foreign repayment or default shocks spillover to the home economy. 
NFA
The focus of this section has been on shocks originating in the foreign (large) economy. In summarizing our results so far, we find the following: The existence of banks per se does not significantly alter the transmission mechanism of productivity shocks, hence 'normal' recessions, are not amplified or dampened by the existence of banks in our model. For shocks originating in the banking sector, the international transmission mechanism depends on the degree of exposure of home banks to foreign loans. Spillovers are modest if home country banks are not directly exposed to foreign loans. In this case, movements in the terms of trade are sufficient to insulate the home economy from the foreign shock. When domestic banks undertake financial intermediation in both the home and the foreign market, a default shock on foreign loans adversely affects the capital position of domestic banks. The result is a rise in the intermediation margin on loans to domestic firms as banks attempt to increase profits with which to re-build their capital stock. A rise in the borrowing rate brings Table 2 compares the business cycle properties of the model economy to US and UK data. In terms of business cycle properties of GDP and its components, the UK is quite similar to the US. Bank lending, measured as M4 lending to PNFCs in the UK and loans and leases in bank credit in the US, is more volatile in the UK than in the US.
Second moments
Bank spreads, defined as the difference between corporate and government bond yields in the UK, and in the US is also more volatile in the UK than in the US. Whereas bank lending is pro-cyclical, the spread, or intermediation margin, is counter-cyclical in both countries. 10
The shocks driving the model are country specific. The UK total factor productivity shock, defined as the Solow residual, has very similar characteristics to its US counter 10 See the data appendix for detailed data sources. Table 1 suggests very similar AR(1) coefficients and standard deviation for the two TFP shocks. Our calculations suggest that the US default rate is both more volatile and more persistent than its UK counter part. The data suggests that in both countries default (loan repayment rate) and productivity shocks are negatively (positively) correlated.
Given the estimated shock processes, we calibrate the adjustment cost parameter, A key feature of the data is the counter-cyclical bank spread. When driven by both TFP and default shocks, our model generates counter-cyclical spreads for both the large and the small economy. As in the data, the US bank spread is somewhat more counter-cyclical than the UK one. Bank lending is pro-cyclical in the data and in which the model generates a "standard" transmission mechanism of productivity shocks, as opposed to "negative" transmission as highlighted by Corsetti et al. (2008) .
the models. Finally, the correlations of the UK's terms of trade and net trade, relative to UK GDP are of the correct sign.
The column headed "Def" reports second moments generated by our model when driven only by "default" shocks. Default shocks alone explain less than 1% of the volatility of GDP, but account for most of the variation in the bank lending as well as the interest rate spread. Crucially, the default shocks account for the countercyclicality of the bank spread. Figure 2 , the correlation between home and foreign (US) GDP following default shocks is larger the greater is the ratio of foreign banking assets to GDP in the small country.
The final column of Table 2 confirms the high correlation between outputs in the absence of consumption home-bias. Table 2 , US GDP, consumption and investment refer to seasonally adjusted real per capita series. GDP is from BEA's NIPA Data for UK are from Office for National Statistics. GDP is Gross Domestic Product, consumption is consumption by households and general government and investment is gross fixed capital formation respectively (all from natpc2 dataset). We convert these series in per capita terms by dividing each series by population (lmsum01 dataset). The terms of trade for UK is defined as the ratio of import price deflator over export price deflator. Import (export) price deflator is calculated by dividing imports (exports) at current prices by imports (exports) at constant prices (natpc1 and natpc2 datasets ). Net trade is from HAVER and corresponds to "Balance on Current
Account as a percentage of GDP". Our measure of loans is from the Bank of England and refers to seasonally adjusted "Quarterly amounts outstanding of monetary financial institutions' sterling net lending excluding securitisations to private non-financial corporations" which we convert to real per capita terms by dividing it by the GDP deflator and population.
Our measure of interest rate spreads for both UK and US is from Datastream, and is quarterly average of monthly differences between corporate (USACRPB and UKMCRPB) and government (USAGLTB, UKMGLTB) bond yields.
Data for exogenous processes
The total factor productivity (TFP) processes for both US and UK are constructed as a residual using the production function presented in the text. For US, capital is private fixed assets from BEA's NIPa table 5.9 and labor is hours of all persons in the nonfarm business sector from Bureau of Labor Statistics. For UK, capital and labor are from ONS and correspond to "Gross Capital Stock" (ZLDO) and "Total actual weekly hours worked" (YBUS) from ONS. For both US and UK the capital stock is extrapolated from annual to quarterly frequency using quarterly investment data.
We then assume that the percentage deviations of TFP from a trend follow an AR (1) process and estimate the following equation for US and UK on linearly detrended TFP :
The default rate for US is from HAVER and refers to "loan delinquency rate on commercial and industrial loans" for all insured commercial banks. We calculate the default rate for UK as a ratio of Quarterly amounts UK resident monetary financial institutions' sterling write-offs of lending to private non-financial corporations" (RPQTFHB) and total loans which is defined above. As for the total factor productivity, we assume that the exogenous repayment process in our model corresponds to deviations of the default rate from a trend. We estimate the following AR(1) process for US and UK on HP filtered default rates:
Given the recent financial crisis and the possible increase in the volatility of the shock processes, we calculate the standard deviations of the exogenous driving processes using data up to the end of 2007. Thoenissen, C. (2011) . Exchange rate dynamics, asset market structure and the role of the trade elasticity. Macroeconomic Dynamics 15 (1), 119 -143.
